The 50 Worst Terrorist Attacks Read online

  The demands of the terrorists were initially unclear; there was some question as to the identities of several of the 53 terrorists imprisoned in Israeli, Swiss, West German, French, and Kenyan jails whose release was demanded. Some reports claimed that five terrorists mentioned in Kenyan jails had plotted to assassinate Idi Amin, who added their names to the end of the hijackers’ list. Others believe that the group attempted to fire heat-seeking missiles at an El Al plane in January 1976 but had been captured and either killed or turned over to the Israelis. The hijackers named Hashi Abdullan, the Somali ambassador to Uganda, as their representative and instructed France to name an envoy for the side of the governments. However, President Amin refused to allow French ambassador Pierre Renard or a special French envoy to deal with the hijackers directly, claiming that he was negotiating with them.

  The hijackers set a deadline of noon on July 1, 1976, for the release of the prisoners, threatening to destroy the plane and all on board. They demanded that the French release Intos Silvia Masmela, a girlfriend of the Venezuelan terrorist Carlos (Ilyich Ramirez Sanchez), and the release from Switzerland of Petra Kraus, the leader of a Baader-Meinhof–type urban terrorist group. West Germany was to release Werner Hopper, Jan-Carl Raspe, Ingrid Shubert, Raphaël Rendat, Inge Viett, and Fritz Tuefel, most of them Baader-Meinhof and Movement 2 June members. They claimed Kenya was holding Abdul Hanafi, Sad, Ibrahim Qasim, Hasan, and Sals. The remaining prisoners were held in Israeli jails; prominent ones included Kozo Okamoto and Melkite Greek Catholic Archbishop Hilarion Capucci (who was being held for smuggling guns to the PFLP). The released prisoners were to be flown to Entebbe International Airport.

  None of the governments gave in to the demands. On June 30, 1976, the hijackers released 47 elderly women, sick persons, and children and allowed an Air France 707 to fly them to Nairobi, Kenya. Ugandan officials said that among those released were 33 French nationals, 3 Moroccans, 2 Greeks, 2 Americans, 2 Dutch nationals, a Canadian, a Cypriot, a Paraguayan, a Venezuelan, and a stateless person.

  The next day, the Israeli cabinet announced that it was willing to negotiate for the release of some prisoners in return for the release of the remaining hostages. This decision followed a demonstration by 50 relatives of the Israeli hostages, who stormed the office of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. The hijackers extended their ransom deadline to July 4, 1976. On July 1, 1976, the terrorists released 100 more hostages. It was learned from the group that a selection had taken place; the non-Jewish hostages were separated from the Israelis or persons of dual nationality. The crew of the Air France plane decided to stay with the Israeli hostages, who were threatened with death by 7:00 A.M. EDT.

  After intervention by France, Yasir Arafat sent a senior Fatah member to Kampala to attempt to secure the release of the hostages. The terrorists refused to meet with him, but allowed Amin to speak to the hostages once more. Israeli Lt. Col. Baruch Bar-Lev telephoned Amin several times, pleading with him to take action to release the hostages, but was unsuccessful.

  On July 2, 1976, the terrorists increased their demands, adding $5 million in compensation for the return of the Air France plane. The Israelis also learned from the tapped telephone of Wadi Haddad (PFLP planner of terrorist operations) in Mogadishu, Somalia, that he had ordered the deaths of the Jewish hostages regardless of the Israeli response. With this information, planning for Operation Thunderbolt, a daring rescue of the hostages, began in earnest.

  The plan called for flying several C-130 Hercules transport planes 2,500 miles to Entebbe from Tel Aviv, securing the release of the hostages, and returning. The Israelis claimed that no other nations were involved in the rescue operation, although many reports held that the Kenyans allowed the planes to refuel in Nairobi, where the Israelis were allowed to treat the wounded with a 33-doctor medical team. Other reports suggested that 50 Israeli agents had arrived in Kenya a few days before the midnight July 4, 1976, raid to arrange details. It was noted that the hijacking was named “Remember the Kenyan Treachery,” making many believe that Kenya had cooperated with the Israelis in the arrest of the five PFLP members in January 1976.

  Because of superior intelligence that many believed was derived from questioning the released hostages, overhead photography, and Israeli agents on the scene in Entebbe, the Israeli mission was a success. The operation was commanded by Brig. Gen. Dan Shomron, 30, head of the paratroopers and infantry. The attack force was led by Lt. Col. Jonathan Netanyahu, 30, a U.S.-born officer shot in the back by Ugandan gunfire during the assault.

  Flying low to avoid hostile radar, the planes landed at a deserted section of the airfield. A black Mercedes led the first group of commandos, who raced to the airport lounge where the hostages were being held. Some reports claimed that a burly Israeli was made up to look like Amin and confuse the Ugandan soldiers. A second group created a diversion by setting off bombs in another area of the field. They later destroyed 11 Ugandan Air Force MiGs so that their planes could not be attacked while returning to Israel. A third group secured the airfield entrance gate, holding off a squad of Ugandan soldiers. Taken by surprise when the gun battle began, the terrorists did not have a chance to shoot any of the hostages. Several hostages were killed or wounded when they stood up in the crossfire. The operation lasted 53 minutes, and all of the planes successfully returned to Israel.

  Israeli authorities believed seven of the terrorists were killed and three who were not present at the airfield escaped. Eleven other Israelis, civilian and military, were wounded. The Israelis believed that about 20 Ugandan soldiers were killed, saying that Amin’s claim of 100 deaths was an exaggeration. Amin later claimed that 20 soldiers died, 13 were seriously wounded, and 19 others were hospitalized. Several governments condemned the Israeli action in press statements and during a UN debate, while others, including the United States, congratulated the Israelis. Amin telephoned the Israelis later in July 1976 to add his own congratulations, to request weapons and military spare parts, and to announce that he had broken relations with the Palestinian terrorists. Amin was ignored by the Israelis, although Libya delivered 20 French-built Mirage jet fighters to replace the destroyed MiGs.

  Amin was reported to have engaged in a wide-scale purge of individuals connected with the guarding of Entebbe airport, with some claims of 245 killed by Amin’s troops as punishment. Among those killed was Dora Bloch, 75, an Israeli British citizen who was left behind in Kampala’s Mulago Hospital where she had been taken after choking on some meat at the airport lounge. Israeli officials attempted to obtain her release through the use of third parties, but it has been reported by a number of sources that two to four men dragged her from the hospital and strangled her. Some reports claimed that her burned body was later found in a field. Although a British official had visited Bloch the day after the raid, Ugandan Radio claimed that she had been returned to the airport and was among those freed in the Israeli attack.

  The identity of the terrorists is disputed. Most reports agreed that the initial leader of the group was Wilfred Boese, an associate of Venezuelan terrorist Carlos. One of the terrorists who joined the group at Entebbe was Antonio Degas Bouvier, an Ecuadorian associate of Carlos. The identity of the woman, who the hostages claimed had acted “like a Nazi” and mistreated all of them, was subject to much speculation. Many claimed that she was Gabrielle Kroecher-Tiedemann, who had taken part in the OPEC raid of December 1975. Others suggested that she was Turkishborn Barin Acturk, who was arrested in Paris in 1973 for gun smuggling, then released after six months and flown to Baghdad. Still others offered the name of Eleanore Honel-Hausman, the widow of Hugo Muller, who died on May 25, 1976, when his suitcase exploded in the Tel Aviv airport. The identity of the Palestinians was also difficult to ascertain. The PFLPclaimed that one of them was a founder of their group, Al Haj Jayez Jaber, who had also founded the terrorist group Heroes of the Return, which had merged with other groups to form the PFLP. Uganda claimed that the dead were Haji Fayez Jaber, Abdel Razzark Sammarraie, Jayel Arj
am, Aboh Khaled Khalayli, and Aboh Ali. The two Europeans were given Arabic pseudonyms, Mahmojud and Halima, saying that the woman was a member of the German Revolutionary Party. French counter espionage said that Boese used the alias Claudius Axel. Others were identified as Jail el-Arja, 39, in charge of South American activities for the PFLP; Faiz Jaber, 44, a member of the PFLP’s military branch in charge of guerrilla operations; and Abd al-Latif Abd al-Razaq, 43, an Iraqi friend of Haddad. Investigative reporters Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne listed Jayel Naji el Arja as second-in-command of the PFLP’s Department of Foreign Relations. They also mentioned that an Abu Ali had contacted the Japanese Red Army in Japan and suggested that the dead terrorist may have been this person.

  The terrorists had flown on Singapore Airlines to Athens from Kuwait. They stayed in the Athens transit lounge where they were not subjected to searches, thereby enabling them to board the plane with their weapons. Several suits were filed by hostages against Air France and Air Singapore for these security breaches. Their outcome has not been released.

  October 6, 1976

  Cubana Flight 455 Bombing

  Overview: Anti-Castro Cubans, most of them based in Miami, Florida, dream of one day returning to a post-communist island. While the vast majority of the Cuban diaspora have subsequently settled down in the United States and other countries, assimilated into the local economy and society and quietly wait for the sclerotic Havana regime to fall of its own weight, some fringe groups have used terrorist tactics in the hopes of moving along Havana’s history. Among these exile groups was the Coordination of United Revolutionary Organizations (CORU), whose exploits included attacks on Cuba interests and allies throughout the world. One of their most notorious attacks was the bombing of a Cubana airliner that killed 76 people. The search for justice extended over several decades.

  Incident: On October 6, 1976, at 2:30 P.M., a bomb exploded on board Cubana Airlines flight 455, a DC-8 flying to Jamaica and Cuba with stops at Georgetown, Guyana, and Port of Spain, Trinidad. The plane had just left Bridgetown, Barbados, when the pilot reported an explosion on board and said that he would try to return. The plane crashed into the ocean, killing all 76 on board. Among them were 59 Cubans, 25 of them Cubana employees, including the crew and 16 members of Cuba’s championship fencing team, 11 Guyanese, 5 North Koreans, 2 Trinidadians, and 1 person each from Colombia and Venezuela. An anti-Castro Cuban exile group, El Condor, claimed credit, as did the CORU.

  On October 8, 1976, police in Port of Spain questioned two Venezuelans who left the plane in Barbados and returned to Trinidad the same night. On October 18, 1976, Hernan Ricardo Losano, who was carrying Venezuelan identity papers, claimed to have placed the bomb on board the plane. He was accompanied by Freddy Lugo. On October 14, 1976, Venezuelan authorities arrested Losano’s employer, Luis Posada Carriles; CORU leader Orlando Bosch, 49; and three other Venezuelans, identified as Oleg Gueton Rodriguez, Celsa Toledo, and Francisco Nunez.

  Bosch had entered the country on a false Costa Rican passport with a tourist visa and also carried a false set of Nicaraguan documents. The U.S. government had tried to extradite him. Bosch had been sentenced to four years in prison for carrying out illegal activities, including firing a bazooka at a Polish ship on September 16, 1968, but had violated his parole and fled to Venezuela on a false passport. It was later learned that Posada was a Cuban who was formerly head of the Venezuelan secret police (DISIP). Losano was an employee of the Caracas detective agency run by Posada. On October 22, 1976, Losano attempted suicide by slashing his wrist. He and Lugo had told police that they were photographers and had traveled to Trinidad to purchase cameras and equipment. There was evidence that they had contacts with Eric Searly, a Barbados political activist and boxing promoter. Trinidad said it would expel the duo. On November 2, 1976, a Venezuelan judge indicted Bosch, Posada, Losano, and Lugo on qualified murder charges, which carry a maximum penalty of 30 years. Five others were released without charges.

  The evidence as to culpability was sketchy. A British search team that found the sunken plane determined that the explosive used was C-4. Losano’s girlfriend took a call from him in Trinidad and relayed the message to Posada’s secretary, “Tell Posada the truck has left with a full load.” Venezuelan security police said that they had uncovered CORU plans for terrorist attacks by Cuban exiles in the United States, Venezuela, Trinidad, Barbados, Guyana, Panama, and Colombia. It was also claimed that shortly after the explosion, a caller from Barbados telephoned the office of a private investigation company in Caracas, “The bus is full of dogs.”

  Havana protested Venezuelan justice minister Fermin Marmol Leon’s conditional release of Losano and Lugo.

  Posada escaped from prison in 1985. Bosch, the alleged mastermind, was acquitted due to lack of evidence.

  On April 12, 2005, Posada, 77, wanted for the Cubana bombing, bombings in Cuban tourist hotels that killed an Italian tourist and injured 11 other people, and a 2000 plot to assassinate Fidel Castro in Panama, applied for political asylum in the United States. On May 17, 2005, U.S. authorities arrested him in Miami after he conducted public interviews with local reporters. On May 19, 2005, the United States charged him with entering the country illegally. On May 21, 2005, Venezuela made a provisional arrest request while thousands throughout the country demonstrated for his return. The United States denied the request on May 27, 2005. A judge ruled on June 20, 2005, that the trial would remain in El Paso and not be moved to Florida. In the fall of 2005, a federal judge ruled that he could not be deported to Cuba or Venezuela. On March 22, 2006, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) said that he would not be released but efforts to deport him to a willing country would continue. On January 11, 2007, he was indicted on one count of naturalization fraud and six counts of making false statements in naturalization proceedings in 2005 and 2006. Also charged were Santiago Alvarez and Osvaldo Mitat, after they refused to testify before a grand jury. They were serving prison sentences on a weapons case. The prosecution said a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) informant claimed that Posada had entered the United States on the Santrina, a shrimping boat manned by Alvarez, Mitat, and others. On April 8, 2011, a jury acquitted him of all charges.

  Lugo, who had been sentenced to 20 years in prison for the bombing campaign, was released in 1993 after 17 years in prison.

  An FBI document filed in the case on May 4, 2007, suggested that the bombing might have been planned in Guatemala.

  October 13, 1977

  Landshut Hijacking and GSG 9 Rescue in Mogadishu

  Overview: By the late 1970s, cooperation between rejectionist Palestinians and leftist European terrorists had reached a high point. Joint training, weapons exchanges, operational insights, and trading of operational personnel freely flowed among the various wings of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), West German Baader-Meinhof Group and other German leftists, Italian Red Brigades, Irish Republican Army (IRA), Petra Kraus Group, Basque Nation and Liberty, and a host of other now-forgotten organizations. But government forces were similarly banding together against the terrorists, with quick reaction elite forces sharing training, tactics, and doctrine. The Israeli success at Entebbe led to numerous special operations teams armed with clipboards and light weapons to learn the lessons of the Israelis. They were put into practice in October 1977, when a West German team traveled thousands of miles to conduct a similarly daring rescue of its citizens from hijackers. The Entebbe and Landshut rescues led terrorists to all but abandon high-profile aerial hijacking sieges.

  Incident: On October 13, 1977, Lufthansa flight 181, a B-737 (called a Landshut) scheduled to fly from the Spanish resort island of Mallorca to Frankfurt, was hijacked 55 minutes after takeoff. Two women hijackers reached into their boots, withdrew guns and hand grenades, and along with two male accomplices, diverted the plane to Rome. On board were 82 passengers and 5 crew. Hostages included a Spanish flight crew, Swedish passengers, an Austrian flight attendant, four West Ge
rman crew, six West German beauty queens, and two Americans.

  Two hijackers identified themselves as Harda Mamoud and Walter Mohammed, who appeared to be their leader. A statement in grammatical and concise Arabic delivered to Reuters in Beirut identified them as the Organization of Struggle against World Imperialism, which confirms the “objectives and demands” of the Red Army Faction kidnappers of industrialist Hanns-Martin Schleyer. The group demanded the release of 11 terrorists from the Socialist Patients’ Collective and Baader-Meinhof Group in West German jails, as well as the release of two PFLP terrorists held in Turkish jails since an attack on August 11, 1976. They demanded $15 million and 100,000 marks for each prisoner. The terrorists demanded to have the prisoners flown to Vietnam, Somalia, or South Yemen.

  The hijackers took off for Cyprus, landing in Larnaca, although the Cypriot government at first barred their arrival. In what came to be known as Operation Oscar X-Ray, Hans-Juergen Wischnewski, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt’s troubleshooter, carrying satchels with millions of marks, set off in a German jet trailing the hijacked plane in the hopes of beginning negotiations. Simultaneously, a West German commando unit began practicing assaults on a similar B-737 in the Cologne, West Germany, airport hangar. Two squads of 32 men each boarded a third jet and headed for Cyprus that night. Soon afterward, the German jet carrying the commandos arrived in Akrotiri, Cyprus, 50 miles from Larnaca, Cyprus. Perhaps fearing an Entebbe-type raid, the hijackers took off for Bahrain.